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Khojazãda on al-Ghazãlì’s Criticism of the Philosophers’ 
Proof of the Existence of God 
 
 
Introduction 
Khojazāda (d. 893/1488) did not 
choose to write his Tahāfut al-
Falāsifa of  his  own  accord.  He  was  
commissioned to do so by the 
Ottoman sultan Mehmed II (r. 
848/1444-850/1446 and 855/1451-
886/1481),1 and when commissioned 
by the sultan, scholars normally obliged. Neither the theme, “the floundering of 
the philosophers”, nor al-Ghazālī’s four-centuries-old text, are starting points 
that the author himself would have elected for a book project. He was much 
more interested in refining the philosophico-theological system of later 
Ashʿarism set out in highly developed expositions in al-Iṣfahānī’s (d. 749/1348) 
Maṭāliʿ al-Anẓār, a commentary on al-Bayḍāwī’s (d. 716/1316) Ṭawāliʿ al-
Anwār, al-Jurjānī’s (d. 816/1413) commentary on al-Ījī’s (d. 756/1355) Mawāqif, 
and al-Taftāzānī’s (d. 793/1390) Sharḥ al-Maqāṣid, on the first two of which he 
wrote incomplete glosses. Anachronistic though it may be, the choice was 
perfectly consonant with what many patrons of scholarship were after: 
stimulating debates involving diametrically-opposed opponents, much like 
duels. Al-Ghazālī’s book was chosen, not because the contents were of 
outstanding philosophical interest for ninth/fifteenth-century thinkers – as we 
will see, the contrary appears to be the case – but because this work written by 
this highly respected figure had an almost legendary status. It originated from 
the dawn of neo-Ashʿarism, at a time when philosophers were still philosophers 
and kalām theologians still theologians. For once, a later Ashʿarī philosopher-
theologian had to abandon his hair-splitting niceties, so utterly boring and 
                                                            
1  As this paper appears in a volume dedicated to Khojazāda, please refer to other chapters 
of the volume for background information on the author and the text. These details have 
been omitted here. 
Ayman Shihadeh, DPhil. 
School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS) 
University of London 
London, UK 
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pedantic for the non-specialist patron, only to be pushed into a more 
monochrome arena. 
During the four centuries or so that separated the two Tahāfuts, the 
tradition of philosophical theology underwent immense developments, evident, 
for instance, in the terminology and the complexity of the arguments. 
Khojazāda makes this amply clear in the Sixth Discussion in his work, “On 
Showing [the Philosophers’] Inability to Prove the Existence of the Maker for the 
World”, in which he is harshly critical of al-Ghazālī, describing the arguments 
set out in the corresponding Fourth Discussion of his Tahāfut as “insubstantial” 
(ḥashf) and “of no consequence” (laysa bi-shayʾ).2 While exposing flaws in al-
Ghazālī’s arguments, Khojazāda nonetheless endorses fully his predecessor’s 
objectives and tactics. He seeks to show that the philosophers make 
contradictory assertions, and proceeds to do so along the same lines followed 
by al-Ghazālī, offering philosophically-sounder alternatives to his arguments. 
The translation of the Sixth Discussion below includes explanatory 
material enclosed in square brackets and some marginal comments where 
necessary, to resolve any ambiguities in the doctrines and arguments discussed. 
The broad outlines of the discussion are as follows: 
1. Al-Ghazālī’s preliminary accusation that the philosophers’ stance is 
patently incoherent and incomprehensible; 
2. Khojazāda dismisses this accusation; 
3. The philosophers’ argument from contingency for the existence of 
the First Principle; 
4. Al-Ghazālī’s objection to the philosophers’ appeal to the argument 
from correspondence against the infinite regress of causes: I. the 
argument from the beginningless series of temporal events; 
5. Khojazāda rejects this objection; 
                                                            
2  al-Ghazālī, Abū Ḥāmid Muḥammad ibn Muḥammad, Tahāfut al-Falāsifa [Algazel Tahafot 
al-Falasifat] (ed. Maurice Bouyges), Imprimerie Catholique, Beirut 1927, 133-142. 
Translated by Michael E. Marmura, The Incoherence of the Philosophers: Tahāfut al-
Falāsifa, Brigham Young University Press, Provo, Utah 1997, 79-84. On this discussion in 
al-Ghazālī’s Tahāfut, see Davidson, Herbert A., Proofs for Eternity, Creation, and the 
Existence of God in Medieval Islamic and Jewish Philosophy, Oxford University Press, 
Oxford 1987, 366-375. 
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6. Al-Ghazālī’s objection to the philosophers’ appeal to the argument 
from correspondence against the infinite regress of causes: II. the 
argument from the infinite number of human souls; 
7. Khojazāda rejects this objection; 
8. Khojazāda advances his own objection to the philosophers’ appeal 
to the argument from correspondence against the infinite regress of 
causes: the argument from the knowledge that higher beings have 
of temporal events; 
9. A defence of al-Ghazālī’s second objection, from the infinite 
number of human souls; 
10. Khojazāda rejects this defence; 
11. An outline of a second argument cited by the philosophers against 
the infinite regress of causes: the argument from the contingency of 
a causal series; 
12. Khojazāda rejects this argument; 
13. Al-Ghazālī’s response to the philosophers’ second argument 
against the infinite regress of causes; 
14. Khojazāda dismisses al-Ghazālī’s response. 
Al-Ghazālī’s attack against the argument from contingency for the 
existence of the First Principle targets the premise that the infinite regress of 
causes is inconceivable. He does this by undermining two proofs that the 
philosophers cite in support of this premise, namely the argument from 
correspondence (nos. 4 and 6) and the argument from the contingency of a 
causal series (no. 13). Khojazāda (no. 4) describes al-Ghazālī’s method of 
argumentation against the first of these proofs as a case of “annulment” (naqḍ). 
A disputant “annuls” an opponent’s argument by contending that the argument 
is unsound, and then supporting this contention with some evidence (shāhid, 
though Khojazāda does not employ this term here).3 
The “argument from correspondence” (burhān al-taṭbīq) goes as 
follows. Consider a series of units that begins at one point and is infinite in one 
direction. We can then consider a different series by subtracting a certain 
number of units (say, one unit) from the finite end of the first series. If we then 
compare the two series by “juxtaposing” them against each other such that each 
                                                            
3  For a recent overview of this method, see al-Maydānī, ʿAbd al-Raḥmān Ḥabannaka, 
Ḍawābiṭ al-Maʿrifa wa-Uṣūl al-Istidlāl wa-l-Munāẓara, Dār al-Qalam, Damascus 1993, 
437 ff. 
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unit in the latter series corresponds to its counterpart in the former series, we 
will find that the former contains an extra unit that does not correspond to any 
units in the latter. The former series, therefore, is longer than the latter by virtue 
of the additional unit it contains. However, it is inconceivable for an infinite 
series to become longer than another infinite series by the addition of a finite 
number of units, for difference in length is conceivable only between series 
consisting of finite quantities of units. Therefore, an infinite series is 
inconceivable.4 
The philosophers are not entitled to appeal to this argument in their 
proof of the existence of the First Principle, according to Khojazāda’s 
presentation of al-Ghazālī’s discussion, because it is annulled (manqūḍ) on 
account of two pieces of evidence, which exhibit the applicability (jarayān) of 
the same argument to two other doctrines, which, by contrast, the philosophers 
do accept. These are, first, the doctrine of temporal events that have no 
beginning (ḥawādith lā awwal la-hā), another case of infinite regress (no. 4), 
and second, the notion of the infinite number of human souls (no. 6). The 
argument from correspondence, thus, is annulled only for the philosophers, vis-
à-vis these doctrines of theirs, and not absolutely, since, Khojazāda explains, it 
is not annulled for kalām theologians, who reject the doctrines of temporal 
events that have no beginning and of an infinite number of human souls. 
Khojazāda (no. 5), however, dismisses al-Ghazālī’s first attempt to 
annul the argument from correspondence for the philosophers on account of 
the doctrine of temporal events that have no beginning. For, unlike an infinite 
series of coexisting causes, the units that comprise a beginningless series of 
temporal events are not coexistent. Hence, it will not be possible to speak of 
correspondence between two such series either in the external world, since 
most units no longer exist, or in the mind, since it cannot perceive an infinite 
number of things simultaneously. 
                                                            
4  On arguments from correspondence, see: Al-Taftāzānī, Saʿd al-Dīn Masʿūd ibn ʿUmar ibn 
ʿAbd Allāh, Sharḥ al-Maqāṣid (ed. ʿAbd al-Raḥmān ʿUmayra), ʿĀlam al-Kutub, Beirut 
1998, II, 120 ff.; al-Jurjānī, Abū l-Ḥasan al-Sayyid al-Sharīf ʿAlī ibn Muḥammad ibn ʿAlī, 
Sharḥ al-Mawāqif (ed. Muḥammad Badr al-Dīn al-Naʿsānī), Maṭbaʿat al-Saʿāda, Cairo 
1907, IV, 167 ff.; Fazlur Rahman, The Philosophy of Mullā Ṣadrā, State University of New 
York Press, Albany, NY 1975, 65 ff. For references to further discussions of this argument 
in medieval sources, see: Davidson, H. A., Proofs for Eternity, 120-121. 
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The second piece of evidence used to annul the philosophers’ 
argument from correspondence, then, seems more promising (no. 6). If this 
argument does not apply to the case of temporal events that have no beginning 
because they are not coexistent, then it should apply to the case of the infinite 
number of human souls, which, according to Ibn Sīnā, are coexistent.5 
Khojazāda rejects this second objection on the grounds that since human souls 
do not form a series consisting of units ordered successively in a discernible 
order, whether in position or nature, it is inconceivable to apply the argument 
from correspondence in this case (no. 7).6 A little later (no. 10), he dismisses a 
possible defence of al-Ghazālī’s argument (no. 9), which attempts to argue that 
human souls are indeed ordered in a series, either chronologically or with 
respect to their nature. 
Notwithstanding his criticism of al-Ghazālī’s arguments, Khojazāda 
does not dismiss the tactic of annulling the argument from correspondence for 
the philosophers. Advancing alternative evidence to affirm this annulment (no. 
8), he confirms that, 
[...] our objective is not [to show] that the argument for the 
inconceivability of infinite regress can never be established, but rather 
to compel [the philosophers] to concede that it cannot be established 
[soundly and coherently] vis-à-vis their principles. It will then follow 
that the existence of the First Principle cannot be established [soundly 
and coherently] within their system. We are able to accomplish this 
objective [...]. 
Though Khojazāda, in his discussion of the philosophers’ proof for the 
existence of God, dismisses all the objections put forth by al-Ghazālī, he 
nonetheless takes his predecessor’s agenda fully on board. The overall objective 
is still the same: to force the philosophers to concede that they are not entitled 
to appeal, in their proof from contingency, to the premise that the infinite 
regress of causes is inconceivable, and ultimately to illustrate that they cannot 
sustain their doctrines because they are contradictory. Furthermore, the main 
                                                            
5  On this problem, see: Marmura, Michael E., “Avicenna and the Problem of the Infinite 
Number of Souls”, Mediaeval Studies 22 (1960), 232-239. 
6  These conditions for the inconceivability of an infinite number of objects – namely, that 
they be coexistent and ordered either in their position or nature – were set forth earlier by 
al-Fārābī and Ibn Sīnā (see, for instance, Davidson, H. A., Proofs for Eternity, 128-129; 368-
369). 
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elements of the discussion are the same. Khojazāda criticises the same two 
arguments for this premise attacked by al-Ghazālī. For the first, the argument 
from correspondence, he rejects the two objections that al-Ghazālī presents to 
annul the argument for the philosophers, and proposes an alternative objection 
to annul the same argument in the same way: by showing that it applies to a 
doctrine involving the affirmation of an infinite number of ordered coexisting 
objects, which, in contrast to the infinite regress of causes, the philosophers do 
accept. 
Compared to the main philosophical and theological summae of the 
period, Khojazāda’s treatment of the proof from contingency appears 
piecemeal. In line with the elements and parameters of al-Ghazālī’s treatment, 
he confines himself to discussing arguments against infinite regress; he 
discusses only two such arguments (al-Taftāzānī discusses seven7); and he does 
so dialectically, and thus non-comprehensively. Ibn Rushd was well justified in 
following al-Ghazālī’s discussion closely in Tahāfut al-Tahāfut: he sought to 
respond to his criticism of the philosophical tradition, which exerted much 
influence in the Maghreb during the sixth/twelfth century. Khojazāda, of 
course, was commissioned by the sultan to write his Tahāfut, but otherwise 
lacked a comparably strong and genuine motive to do so. Though the 
dichotomy mutakallim-faylasūf was still current in the philosophical and 
theological literature of the period, it was of a primarily theoretical significance, 
and the real tension between the two sides a thing of a bygone era. This might 
explain why the Sixth Discussion of Khojazāda’s Tahāfut – and the same is not 
necessarily true of the book as a whole – appears to be essentially a critical 
update of the corresponding discussion in al-Ghazālī’s work. 
Note on the Translation: The translation below is based on the 
holograph copy (MS Istanbul, Süleymaniye Library, Şehid Ali Paşa, 1583, fols. 
45a-48a; referred to as M). Corrections to the lithograph edition (ed. ʿAbduh 
Muṣṭafā Qushaysha al-Ashʿarī al-Shāfiʿī, al-Maṭbaʿat al-Iʿlāmiyya, Cairo 1303 AH, 
47-51; referred to as L), as well as page and folio numbers, are noted in the 
margins.8 
 
                                                            
7  al-Taftāzānī, Sharḥ al-Maqāṣid, II, 114-131. 
8  For a description of the manuscript and lithograph copies, see: “Hocazâde’nin Eserleri”, 
382-383, in the present volume. 
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Translation 
 
The Sixth Discussion: 
On Showing [the Philosophers’] Inability to Prove the Existence of the 
Maker for the World, Which Comprises the Heavens and What is 
Therein and the Elements and What Consists Thereof 
[1. Al-Ghazālī’s Accusation that the Philosophers’ Stance is Incomprehensible] 
The Imām al-Ghazālī, may God’s mercy be upon him, says9 that those 
who assert that the world is originated in time have an apprehensible doctrine 
concerning the existence of the Maker, as it follows necessarily from [the 
premise] that every originated thing requires an originator, and that [the series 
of originated things and originators] cannot regress ad infinitum, as this would 
be inconceivable, but must terminate in a pre-eternal being. Those, on the other 
hand, who maintain that the world is pre-eternal and does not require a maker, 
their doctrine too is comprehensible, even though its falsity is then shown by 
means of proof. As to the philosophers, they assert that the world is pre-eternal 
then, despite this, have affirmed for it a maker. This juxtaposition is 
contradictory, and its falsity in need of no exposition. 
[2. Khojazāda’s Response] 
[To this,] I say: 
If by this he intends that a thing’s being pre-eternal contradicts both its 
causedness and its being an effect of a cause, then this cannot be conceded, 
considering that he previously allowed this. If, however, he intends that 
“maker” means “one who existentiates things after they did not exist”, then, 
supposing that we accept this [notion], this would not affect [the philosophers]. 
For they do not affirm for the world a maker in this sense, for a contradiction to 
follow, but instead affirm a cause for [the world’s] existence on account of its 
contingency. If they choose to name that Cause the “Maker”, then they will not 
                                                            
9  Cf. al-Ghazālī, Tahāfut, 133-134; Marmura, M. E. (trans.), Incoherence, 79. 
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intend one who creates [the world] in time, but one who existentiates [it]. [The 
philosophers’] doctrine, therefore, involves no contradiction. 
Moreover, there is no need10 for him to mention this [supposed] 
contradiction in his explanation of the objective of this chapter. For the 
objective is to expose their inability to set out a proof for the existence of the 
Principle of this world; and this does not presuppose the contradiction that he 
mentioned.11 
[3. An Outline of the Philosophers’ Proof of the Existence of God] 
In affirming the Principle of this world, [the philosophers] assert that the 
mind knows immediately that every existent must be either contingent or 
necessary.12 For if it depends for its existence on another being, it will be 
contingent. Otherwise, it will be necessary of existence. 
There is no doubt that something exists. If, then, [that which exists] is a 
necessary existent, the thing we are after will be affirmed. For contingent beings 
will depend on it [for their existence]; otherwise, circularity or infinite regress 
[would be inevitable]. If, however, it is contingent, then it must have a cause. If 
that cause, [in turn,] has a further cause, then the same reasoning will apply to it. 
[The series of] causes will then either be circular, or be infinitely regressing, or 
terminate in a being that has no cause. As the first two [divisions] are false, the 
third must be true. 
That [necessary] being cannot be a body. The reason for this is that 
bodies are composite, while a being that has no cause cannot be composite.13 
                                                            
10  M 45b. 
11  M: + maʿa annahū lā ḥāja ilā mā dhakarahū min al-tanāquḍ fī bayān gharaḍ hādhā l-
faṣl fa-inna l-gharaḍ minhu bayān ʿajzihim ʿan iqāmat al-dalīl ʿalā wujūd mabdaʾ al-
ʿālam wa-hādhā lā yatawaqqaf ʿalā mā dhakarahū min al-tanāquḍ. 
12  This argument is not taken from al-Ghazālī’s Tahāfut, but reflects the version advanced by 
Ibn Sīnā (e.g. al-Najāt [ed. Mājid Fakhrī], Dār al-Āfāq al-Jadīda, Beirut 1982, 271-272). On 
this proof, see, for instance: Marmura, M. E., “Avicenna’s Proof from Contingency for 
God’s Existence in the Metaphysics of  the Shifāʾ”, Mediaeval Studies 42 (1980), 337-352; 
Davidson, H. A., Proofs for Eternity, 281 ff.; Mayer, Toby, “Ibn Sīnā’s ‘Burhān al-Ṣiddīqīn’”, 
Journal of Islamic Studies 12 (2001), 18-39. 
13  L: + li-anna kull murakkab muḥtāj ilā ʿilla. 
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Nor can it be part of [a body]; for each of the two components of the body14 
requires the other.15 Nor can it be a soul or an intellect; for the necessary being 
is one and true (wāḥid ḥaqq) in all respects, whereas they are not so. It follows 
that there must be a being that is extraneous to the totality of the world and acts 
as its cause, which is what we are after.16 
[4. Al-Ghazālī’s Principal Objection to the Philosophers’ 
Appeal to the Argument from Correspondence] 
The Imām al-Ghazālī, may God’s mercy be upon him, objected to [this 
proof] on two counts.17 First, why could that Principle not be one of the 
heavenly spheres? As to their contention that bodies are composite whereas the 
necessary being is not so, we will discuss this further below, God willing.18 
Second, why could there not be for each cause a further cause ad 
infinitum? The inconceivability of infinite regress cannot be squared with [the 
philosophers’] own principles.19 For there is no disagreement that the 
inconceivability of this is not known immediately. Furthermore, of the 
arguments put forth to demonstrate this inconceivability, the most relied-on is 
the “argument from correspondence” (burhān al-taṭbīq), which is annulled 
(manqūḍ) by [the philosophers’ acceptance of the doctrine of] successive 
temporal events that have no beginning (ḥawādith mutaʿāqiba lā awwal la-
hā), which, they admit, is conceivable and actually occurred. Kalām 
theologians, by contrast, reject [the doctrine of] successive temporal events that 
have no beginning, and consider it inconceivable. Hence, [the argument from 
correspondence] will not be annulled by their principles. 
 
 
                                                            
14  L 48. 
15  This seems to be a reference to form and matter.  
16  M: + la-hā. 
17  Cf. al-Ghazālī, Tahāfut, 135 ff.; Marmura, M. E. (trans.), Incoherence, 80 ff. 
18  The first objection that al-Ghazālī actually puts forth in Discussion 4 is different. 
19  Reading lā tastatibb ʿalā aṣlikum (M), rather than lā tastabīn ʿalā aṣlihim (L). 
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[5. Khojazāda’s Response] 
The response given to [al-Ghazālī’s claim that the philosophers cannot 
appeal to the argument from correspondence] is this:20 
Since successive temporal events that have no beginning are not 
coexistent, it will not be possible to conceive of correspondence between 
individual [temporal events], neither in the extra-mental world since they do not 
coexist there, nor in the mind given the inconceivability of the existence of 
what is infinite, with [its individual units] fully set out, in the mind. The 
existence of [such an infinite series, conceived of] abstractly, in the mind is 
insufficient to [apply the method of] correspondence: we know [this fact] 
inwardly within ourselves. Therefore, the argument [from correspondence] does 
not apply in this [case],21 and the [aforementioned attempt at] annulment comes 
to naught (fa-lā jarayān li l-dalīl fī-hā fa-lā naqḍ). 
The same is not true of the infinite number of coexisting bodies 
ordered successively in place. For due to their coexistence and positional 
arrangement, [the argument from] correspondence applies in this [case], and the 
demonstration [concerning the inconceivability of an infinite number of 
coexisting bodies] can be set out soundly. That is why they pronounced this to 
be inconceivable.22 
[6. Al-Ghazālī’s Argument from the Infinite Number of Human Souls] 
If you then say: 
“Even if we admit that [our attempt to establish that the argument from 
correspondence] is annulled by [the philosophers’ acceptance of] successive 
temporal events [that have no beginning] has been obviated, the argument 
[from correspondence] can nevertheless be annulled [for the philosophers] by 
[their doctrine of] human souls. For despite being, according to them, infinite in 
number, [human souls] are coexistent, since, as they claim, they endure 
eternally after the corruption of the body”. 
                                                            
20  This response is mentioned briefly by al-Ghazālī (Tahāfut, 136; Marmura, M. E. [trans.], 
Incoherence, 81). 
21  M 46a. 
22  Reading bi-buṭlānihī (L), rather than bi-burhānihī (M). 
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[7. Khojazāda’s Response] 
[To this,] I say:23 
[This argument from] human souls, too, fails to annul [the argument 
from correspondence for the philosophers]. For since there is no order 
whatsoever, with respect to either position (waḍʿ) or nature (ṭabʿ), among 
[human souls], the aforementioned demonstration [from correspondence] will 
not apply to them. For it will not follow from the correspondence between the 
first [soul] from the first of two sets [of souls] and the first [soul] from the second 
set [of souls], that the second [soul from the first set] will correspond to the 
second [soul from the second set], the third [from the first set] will correspond to 
the third [from the second set], and so forth until the correspondence is set out 
fully, unless, perhaps, if the mind considers each individual [soul] from the first 
set and treats it as corresponding to an individual [soul] from the second set. 
The mind, however, is incapable of perceiving infinite things, individually, 
whether concurrently or within a finite period of time, for the [method of] 
correspondence to become possible, and for [al-Ghazālī’s] reductio ad 
absurdum to work. Rather, [the method of] correspondence becomes 
inapplicable as soon as it ceases to take its cue from both the imagination and 
reason. 
[8. The Argument from the Knowledge that Higher Beings 
Have of Temporal Events] 
It may be said: 
Although successive temporal events do not coexist extra-mentally, 
they do, according to [the philosophers], coexist in the “shadow” (ẓillī) mode of 
existence, since they coexist in the knowledge of the higher beings. This 
suffices us in establishing the annulment [of the argument from 
correspondence] vis-à-vis their principles. Let it not be argued, “Perhaps [the 
philosophers] affirm these items of knowledge in a sense other than that of 
mental existence; or perhaps they do not maintain that those items of 
knowledge are ordered, given that they are not subject to time”. For we would 
                                                            
23  This response is mentioned briefly by al-Ghazālī (Tahāfut, 137; Marmura, M. E. [trans.], 
Incoherence, 81). 
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say that our objective is not [to show] that the argument for the inconceivability 
of infinite regress can never be established, but rather to compel [the 
philosophers] to concede that it cannot be established [soundly and coherently] 
vis-à-vis their principles. It will then follow that the existence of the First 
Principle cannot be established [soundly and coherently] within their system. 
We are able to accomplish this objective; for since they assert that the intellects 
and souls possess knowledge [of things] by virtue of the presence in them of the 
forms of things – indeed, for Abū ʿAlī [ibn Sīnā], even the knowledge of the First 
Principle is thus – successive temporal events, which occur in the extra-mental 
existence, will coexist in their knowledge in a shadow mode of existence. As to 
the lack of order among those items of knowledge given that they are not 
subject to time, this is an insignificant point [for two reasons].  
The first reason is that the order among those temporal events is not 
merely the order of their chronological occurrence. Rather, there is, according 
to [the philosophers], a natural order among them,24 since some [temporal 
events] depend [for their existence] on others, as they affirm in their basic 
principles. Let it not be said, “The natural order among temporal events is only 
present in their concrete mode of existence, to the exclusion of the shadow 
mode [of existence]”. For, we would say: The higher principles, according to 
[the philosophers], know things on account of their knowledge of the causes [of 
things]. Hence, since every temporal event is part of the cause of another 
temporal event,25 knowledge of every temporal event is part of the cause of the 
knowledge of another temporal event. It follows that26 order will be present in 
the shadow mode of existence too. 
The second reason is that those items of knowledge are not subject to 
time only with respect to the three [temporal] attributions, namely pastness, 
presentness and futurity, in the sense that the knowledge that [higher beings 
have] of temporal events is not [knowledge] of the occurrence of some of them 
in the present27 and of others in the future. For there is no past, present or future 
for [higher beings]. Rather, they know [temporal events] as occurring at the time 
of their occurrence; and this is sufficient for [their knowledge of temporal 
events to have a] chronological order. 
                                                            
24  M 46b. 
25  L 49. 
26  L: + al-ṭabīʿī. 
27  L: + wa-baʿḍahā fī l-māḍī. 
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Therefore, the argument from correspondence will be applicable to this 
[case], as dictated by [the philosophers’] basic principles. [The argument from 
correspondence] will, hence, be annulled by [its applicability to this case]. 
[9. A Defence of the Argument from 
the Infinite Number of Human Souls] 
As to human souls, some have claimed that they are ordered among 
themselves, with respect to both position and nature.28 Hence, they, too, will be 
subject to the argument from correspondence, which will consequently be 
annulled by this. The positional [order among human souls] follows from the 
order of the moments of time in which they come into being, while the natural 
[order among human souls] follows from [the fact that the existence of] a child’s 
soul [presupposes the existence] of his body, which [in turn] presupposes the 
soul of the parent, which generates the matter of the child’s body. 
[10. Khojazāda’s Response] 
[The notion that the argument from correspondence] can be applied [to 
the problem of the infinite number of human souls], on account of [their] 
positional order, can be ruled out because not all individual [souls] are ordered 
[in this way]. For a group of [souls] may come into being simultaneously at a 
given point in time, and another group, which may be smaller or larger, at a 
different point in time, whereas [a series of] individual [souls] may come into 
being at successive moments. Hence, it is not possible to conceive of all [souls] 
as being ordered in succession simply on account of the successive order of the 
points in time [in which they come into being]. Some [souls] may indeed be 
ordered in chronological succession, such as the souls of Zayd and his 
forefathers ad infinitum. However, with respect to their being related to the 
moments of their coming into being they do not coexist, since it is 
inconceivable for those moments to coexist, and without them they cannot be 
ordered [chronologically]. 
[The notion that the argument from correspondence can be applied to 
the problem of the infinite number of human souls], on account of [their] natural 
                                                            
28  Cf. al-Ghazālī, Tahāfut, 137-138; Marmura, M. E. (trans.), Incoherence, 81-82. 
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order, [is ruled out] because the soul of the parent acts as a cause for specific 
motions that [in turn] are preparatory causes for the actualisation of the matter 
of the child[’s body], which plays a role in the coming into being of the child’s 
soul. There will, thus, be a sequentially-ordered series consisting of the parent’s 
soul, those motions, the [child’s] body and the child’s soul. Yet, as some of the 
units that comprise this series then cease to exist, namely the specific motions 
and the [child’s] body, there can be no correspondence among the units [of such 
series], because of the inconceivability of correspondence between existents 
and non-existents, or between non-existents among each other. As to the 
remaining, [existent] units,29 there will be no order among them. For they are 
connected only through the intermediation of those preparatory things;30 hence, 
if [the latter] cease to exist, there will be no connection or dependence left 
[between the remaining units], and each will exist separately and independently 
of others. Therefore, none will correspond to another, because of the lack of 
order among them,31 unless the mind considers each individually and treats it as 
corresponding to another. However, you already know that the mind is 
incapable of that. 
[11. The Philosophers’ Argument against the Infinite Regress of Causes 
from the Contingency of a Causal Series] 
If it is then said: 
“The philosophers have, in addition to the demonstration from 
correspondence, a different demonstration, which proves conclusively the 
inconceivability of the infinite regress of causes, with which the proof of the 
existence of the First Principle for beings will become complete. This [goes as 
follows]. If every contingent being depends [for its existence] on another 
contingent being ad infinitum, then, if you consider this whole [causal] series, 
without including therein anything extraneous to it or excluding anything 
belonging to it, there will be no doubt that [the series] will itself be contingent, 
because it will depend on its components, which are other than it. Therefore, 
because it is contingent, [the series] must have a cause. That cause, then, cannot 
be [the series] itself, since the thing cannot act as its own cause; for otherwise it 
                                                            
29  M 47a. 
30  Reading al-muʿiddāt (M), rather than al-maʿdūmāt (L). 
31  M: + li-ʿadam al-tarattub baynahā. 
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would precede itself, which is patently absurd. Nor can it be a component [of 
the series itself], because what causes the existence of the whole will be the 
cause of existence for each of its components; however, this would entail that 
that  component  be  a  cause  for  itself,  which  is  absurd,  as32 we have just 
explained. It follows that [the cause] must be extraneous to [the series]. 
“That extraneous cause, then, will undoubtedly cause the existence of 
one component in that series. For had each of its components been caused by 
something other than [the extraneous cause], then the whole, too, would have 
been caused by something other than [that extraneous cause], since there is 
nothing in the whole other than its parts.33 The extraneous cause, in this case, 
would not be a cause for the whole. Yet we have posited the contrary to this. 
“Now, if the extraneous cause causes the existence of each component 
in the series, then it must act, for one individual [component] among them, 
either as a complete or an incomplete cause.34 It is inconceivable that the 
individual [component] caused by that extraneous cause be either the final 
[effect] or an intermediate effect. Otherwise, if we suppose the completeness [of 
the extraneous cause], the same effect would be produced by two complete 
causes;35 or if we suppose the incompleteness [of the extraneous cause], a 
complete cause would be complemented [by an auxiliary thing], as we have 
already posited that each individual component of the components of which 
                                                            
32  Reading ka-mā (M), rather than li-mā (L). 
33  In other words, for the extraneous cause to cause the existence of the whole series, it must 
directly produce one of its components. If none of the components are produced by this 
extraneous cause, then it cannot act as the cause of the whole; for the whole has no reality 
other than its parts. 
34  On the complete cause (ʿilla mustaqilla), see, for instance, al-Tahānawī, Muḥammad Aʿlā 
ibn ʿAlī, Kashshāf Iṣṭilāḥāt al-Funūn (ed. ʿAlī Daḥrūj et al.), Maktabat Lubnān, Beirut 
1996, II, 1209. 
35  Since each unit in this series is caused by another cause in the series, then if the 
extraneous cause is supposed to cause an intermediate effect (“intermediate” in the sense 
of both being caused by another unit in the series and acting as a cause for another unit) 
or a final effect in the series (“final” in the sense that it is caused by another unit in the 
series, but does not cause a further unit), the effect will be caused, at once, by both 
another unit in the series and the extraneous cause. The same effect, however, cannot be 
the product of two complete causes. 
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the series is comprised acts as a complete cause for another [component].36 It 
follows that [the individual component caused by that extraneous cause] must 
be the final37 individual component of38 the series, at which the series will 
terminate.” 
[12. Khojazāda’s Response] 
[To this,] we say: 
We can select the option that the cause of the series is one of its 
components. If, by his contention,39 “What causes the existence of the whole 
will be the cause of existence for each of its components”, [the philosopher] 
intends that that which causes the existence of the whole must itself cause 
[directly] the existence of each of its individual components, then this cannot be 
conceded. If, however, he intends that that which causes the existence of the 
whole is the cause, either itself or [indirectly] through the components of [the 
whole], of each of its individual components, then this will be granted. Yet this 
does not [force us to concede] a consequence that we would not want to 
concede. For it will then be conceivable that that which precedes the effect that 
occurs at the end of the infinite [series] is the cause of the series.40 Though [this 
cause], due to its contingency, will [in turn] require41 a further cause, [the latter] 
cause will nonetheless be a component [of the series], specifically that 
[component] which precedes the second effect, and so forth ad infinitum. 
As to what is said [by, or on behalf of, the philosophers]: 
“What is intended by ‘cause’ in the [above] exposition of the proof is the 
complete agent (al-fāʿil al-mustaqill), in the sense that absolutely every 
component in the series is caused either [directly] by it or [indirectly] by an 
                                                            
36  In this case, the extraneous cause would act as an auxiliary for the complete cause, which 
is a unit within the series. A complete cause, however, would not be complete if it 
required an auxiliary. 
37  Reading akhīran (M), rather than ākhar (L). This final individual unit of the series seems to 
be the first cause in the series, which must be uncaused, as the possibility that it be the 
final effect has just been excluded. 
38  L 50. 
39  L: + li-anna. 
40  Reading li l-silsila (M), rather than li l-tasalsul (L). 
41  M 47b. 
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effect thereof. By contrast, ‘that which precedes the final effect ad infinitum’ is 
obviously not a complete agent in this sense.” 
The response to this is [as follows]: 
What is known to us is that every contingent being that is composed of 
multiple contingent beings must have been produced by a complete agent. 
However, “completeness”, in the sense that absolutely every component of that 
composite thing is caused either [directly] by [that complete cause] or [indirectly] 
by an effect thereof, is only necessarily true of what is composed of a finite 
number of individual [components] that produce one another. As to what is 
composed of an infinite number of individual [components] that produce one 
another, as we have posited in the case of the series we are presently 
discussing, we do not concede that it will, by necessity, have a complete agent 
in this sense. Why would it not be sufficient for [what is composed of an infinite 
number of units] to have a complete agent in the sense that what is composite 
does not require an extraneous agent?42 Indeed, what we have already 
mentioned implies this sense of “completeness” here. 
If you say: 
“Whichever component of the series is posited as the cause [of the 
series], the cause [of that component] will have precedence over it to be the 
cause [of the series], since the effect of [the former] component is to produce all 
that its antecedents, while the effect of its cause is to produce both it and all its 
antecedents. Therefore, if the cause of the series is a component thereof, the 
balance will be tipped in favour of the less likely possibility without a factor that 
makes it preponderant (lazima tarajjuḥ al-marjūḥ bi-lā murajjiḥ).” 
[To this,] we say: 
The initial and essential producer of the series is that which precedes 
the final effect, since it will produce the final effect and the series will terminate. 
As to its cause, it produces it by virtue of its essence, and through it produces 
the series.43 Therefore, it will be individually identified as the cause of the 
series.44 
                                                            
42  This seems to suggest that the complete cause is not extraneous to the series, but a part 
thereof. 
43  What Khojazāda is saying here is not entirely clear. If the expression “initial” (awwal) is 
not understood in an absolute sense, this will not be an admission that the series must be 
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[13. Al-Ghazālī’s Response to the Second Argument  
against the Infinite Regress of Causes] 
The Imām al-Ghazālī, may God’s mercy be upon him, says in his 
dismissal of the second proof for the inconceivability of the infinite regress of 
causes:45 
“The expressions ‘the contingent’ and ‘the necessary’ are ambiguous 
expressions, unless by ‘necessary’ is intended ‘that whose existence has no 
cause’, and by ‘contingent’ ‘that whose existence has a cause’. If this is what is 
intended, then let us turn again to these expressions. We will say: Each one of 
[the components] is contingent in the sense that it has a cause additional to 
itself, while the whole is not contingent [but necessary] in the sense that it does 
not have a cause additional to itself, extraneous to it.46 If, however, by the 
expression ‘contingent’ is intended other than what we intended, this would be 
incomprehensible. 
“If it is then said, ‘This leads to [the consequence] that the necessary 
existent would have its subsistence through contingent things, which is 
inconceivable’, we say: If by ‘necessary’ you intend what we have mentioned, 
then this is the very thing we are after. We do not concede that it is contingent. 
This is similar to one’s saying, ‘It is inconceivable for the pre-eternal to have its 
subsistence in temporal events’, when time, according to them, is pre-eternal 
and the individual rotations [of the celestial spheres] are temporal: [so, 
individual rotations] have beginnings, whereas [their] totality has no 
beginning.47 Hence, that which has no beginning has been rendered subsistent48 
by things that have beginnings, and ‘having beginning’ becomes true of 
                                                                                                                                           
caused by an uncaused cause. The text indeed suggests that that unit within the series, 
which by virtue of its essence produces all that issues from it, is itself caused by a further 
cause that produces it, and through it the rest of the series, by virtue of its essence. The 
series of causes will thus continue ad infinitum. 
44  M: + hādhā? L: + min ghayr maḥdhūr hādhā. 
45  Cf. al-Ghazālī, Tahāfut, 138-140. Much use has been made here of Marmura’s translation 
(Incoherence, 82-83). 
46  Marmura (Incoherence, 236, n. 4) explains this as follows: “The whole series of infinite 
causes would be necessary (not possible in this sense), but each individual component of 
the series would remain possible, requiring an individual cause.” 
47  Reading lā awwala lah (M), rather than al-awwal (L). 
48  M 48a. 
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individual units, but not true of the whole. Similarly, it is said about each 
individual unit that it has a cause, but it will not be said about the totality that it 
has a cause. Not all that is true of the individual units is necessarily true of the 
totality. For it would be true of each individual unit that it is one, that it is a part, 
and that it is a component, but none of this would be true of the totality. Every 
place on earth that we specify will be lit by the sun during the day and becomes 
dark during the night, and each [of these two events] comes into temporal 
existence after not being; in other words, it has a beginning. However, the 
totality, according to [the philosophers], has no beginning. Therefore, it has 
become evident that whoever allows the conceivability of temporal events that 
have no beginning – namely the forms of the elements and all things that 
undergo change – will be unable to deny that causes could be infinite. From 
this it follows that [the philosophers], for this difficulty, have no way to 
accomplish [their goal of] affirming the First Principle. The distinction [they 
make between the two cases] hence reduces to sheer arbitrariness.” 
[14. Khojazāda’s Response] 
This is [al-Ghazālī’s discussion] verbatim. [To this,] I say: 
This is all insubstantial!49 For what is intended by “the contingent” is 
what has a cause other than itself,50 and by ‘the necessary’ what does not have a 
cause, whether or not it be extraneous to it.51 Hence, the whole will be 
contingent because of its need for a cause, namely its components; and it is 
inconceivable for the necessary being to have its subsistence through what is 
contingent in this sense. Making an analogy between this case and that of the 
subsistence of the pre-eternal in temporal things may be apt. However, [his] 
ascription of [the view] that the analogue is conceivable to the philosophers is 
most appalling! 
His saying, “Since the individual rotations [of the celestial spheres] are 
temporal and have beginnings, whereas [their] totality, according to [the 
philosophers], has no beginning, that which has no beginning has been 
rendered subsistent by things that have beginnings”, is of no consequence. For 
                                                            
49  Reading ḥashf (M), rather than ḥashw (L). 
50  L 51. 
51  Reading kāna khārija ʿanhu aw lā (M), rather than kānat dākhila aw khārija (L). 
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no one claims that the totality of the rotations is subsistent.52 How could any 
sensible person allow himself to assert that the totality, a component of which 
occurred today, is pre-eternal and has no beginning! For since the realisation of 
the whole requires the realisation of all of its components, the whole, prior to 
the realisation of some of its parts, will not be realised to start with. [This point 
would be even more compelling] in the case of a pre-eternal [series]. 
Indeed, what does actually appear in [the philosophers’] discussions is 
that the species of motion is pre-eternal, and that individual [instances of 
motion] are temporal, in the sense that each rotation is preceded by another 
rotation53 ad infinitum, and that their species is sustained by the infinite 
succession of individual [instantiations]. How different this is from [the view 
that] the totality is pre-eternal, though some of its components are temporal! 
Although that which is true of each component is not necessarily true of the 
whole, this does not entail that what is true of each individual [unit] is not true 
of the whole. For some characteristics are shared by both the whole and the 
part. Pre-eternity is [a characteristic] that when affirmed as true of the whole 
must be affirmed as true of each part [thereof]. Temporality is [a characteristic] 
that when affirmed as true of the part must be affirmed as true of the whole. 
This is known immediately and cannot be disputed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
52  Reading qāʾiman (M), rather than qadīman (L). 
53  M: + dawra. 
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Abstract 
 
This paper offers an introduction to, and a translation of, the Sixth 
Discussion in Khojazāda’s Tahāfut al-Falāsifa, entitled “On Showing the 
Philosophers’ Inability to Prove the Existence of the Maker for the World”. It 
shows that although Khojazāda dismisses all the objections put forth by al-
Ghazālī against the argument from contingency for the existence of the First 
Principle, particularly against the premise that the infinite regress of causes is 
inconceivable, he nonetheless takes his predecessor’s broader objectives and 
dialectical agenda fully on board. This gives the impression that the discussion 
is essentially a critical update of the corresponding Fourth Discussion in al-
Ghazālī’s Tahāfut. Whether or not the same is true of Khojazāda’s book as a 
whole is still to be seen. 
 
 
Özet 
Gazâlî’nin Felsefecilerin Allah’ın Varlığı Konusundaki 
Delillerine Eleştirisi Üzerine Hocazâde’nin Görüşleri 
 
Bu çalışma, Hocazâde’nin Tehâfütü’l-Felâsife’sindeki “Felsefecilerin 
Âlemin Bir Yaratıcısı Olduğunu İspattaki Yetersizlikleri” isimli Altıncı Bölüm’e 
bir giriş ve çeviri sunacaktır. Gazâlî’nin Mebde-i Evvel’in varlığına yönelik 
imkân delilinin, özellikle de sonsuz illetlerin imkânsız olduğuna dair ilkenin 
karşısına koyduğu tüm itirazları reddetmesine rağmen Hocazâde, Gazâlî’nin 
genel itirazlarına katılır ve diyalektik tarzına uyar. Bu bize Hocazâde’deki 
tartışmanın, Gazâlî’nin Tehâfüt’ündeki ilgili Dördüncü Bölüm’ün eleştirel bir 
yeniden yazımı olduğu izlenimini vermektedir. Bütünüyle Hocazâde’nin kitabı 
hakkında aynı şeyin geçerli olup olmadığı ise ileride görülecektir. 
  
